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Abstract: This paper analyses the choice of the bargaining agenda in a public/private 
unionised monopoly. Both the public and private monopolist always prefers the 
Right-To-Manage (RTM) to the Efficient Bargaining (EB) agenda. Private monopoly 
is socially preferred to the public one and conflict of interests on the preferred agenda 
arises between Government on one side and workers and consumers on the other 
side. In case of threat of market entry, the public (private) monopolist may 
strategically commit to RTM  (EB) to deter entrance. If RTM is the ex-ante industry 
practice, a public incumbent company cannot use the EB agenda as a strategic tool to 
deter entry, while an incumbent private company can use it. An opposite result holds 
when EB is the established practice in the industry: the incumbent public company 
can use RTM to deter entry, while the incumbent private company cannot. The social 
welfare implications are analysed.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The scope and the selection of the bargaining agenda take on a crucial role in labour-
management relations and negotiations, both in the public and private sector of the 
economy. The course of actions defining the union-firm bargaining is essential both 
for the regulations in the labour market and the configuration of production activities 
in industries that can be characterized by the presence of private and public 
monopolies.  
The paper aims to clarify some element of controversy in the labour-management 
relations and the negotiation process which are indispensable for the suitable working 
of labour and product markets, and the assessment of the consequences on social 
welfare. In particular, the paper concentrates on the following two aspects. 
First, the present work investigates the effects of the adoption of different negotiation 
agendas (right-to-manage, RTM vs. efficient bargaining, EB) on firm profits, union 
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utility, consumer’s surplus and overall social welfare, comparing  private and public 
monopolies. Second, the work analyses the issue of entry in the public/private 
monopolised sector, with subsequent public/private provision of goods in the 
presence of unions, and the use of the bargaining agenda as a tool to prevent entry of 
a potential private/public competitor in the industry.  
A previous literature focused on the investigation of whether the state-owned 
enterprises pay higher wages than identical privately-owned firms, and which are the 
long run effects of privatisation on wages and on the market equilibrium (De Fraja, 
1993; Haskel and Szymanski, 1993; Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón, 2009). More recently, 
Ishida and Matsushima (2009), Andaluz (2011) and Choi (2012) examined the effects 
of wage regulation for civil servants employed in the public sector and the issue of 
whether it is preferable Cournot o Bertrand competition in a mixed private-public 
duopoly when unions are present, respectively. However, none of these papers 
devotes the attention to the issue of the bargaining agenda in a public monopoly.  
The reference framework of the present paper is a classic unionised monopoly. The 
issue of the bargaining agenda selection has been recently investigated by some 
works in a private oligopoly context, such as Bughin (1999), Buccella (2011) and 
Fanti (2014, 2015). Such papers focused on the strategic effects played by different 
bargaining arrangements on the oligopolistic competition by firms, and have shown 
mixed results. Very recently Fanti and Buccella (2015a,b) have investigated this issue 
in a context of a private monopolistic firm under the presence of managerial 
delegation and/or consumption externalities. These papers have shown that also in the 
private monopolistic context the choice of bargaining agenda is a relevant issue for 
the monopolist and the society.  
Moreover, those authors concentrate also on the interconnections between entry and 
the bargaining agenda. Bughin (1999) investigates different market structures 
(duopoly vs. monopoly with threat of potential entry), and diverse entry modes and 
constraints on the negotiation agenda selection. That author suggests that, in a pure 
private unionized duopoly, the EB agenda is the industry equilibrium for each firm. 
Using a conjectural variation model, and in contrast to Bughin (1999), Buccella 
(2011) demonstrates that a conflict of interest among the negotiating parties arises as 
regards the agenda. In particular, when the duopoly is the given market structure, 
RTM is the firms’ dominant strategy while EB is the unions’ dominant strategy. 
Nevertheless, in a monopoly with threat of market entry, the parties in the incumbent 
company can agree on the EB agenda to deter entry. Fanti and Buccella (2015b,c) 
broadly reconsider the issue of entry in a unionized monopoly considering a large 
number of timing specification of the bargaining game, confirming the potential 
market deterrence effect of the EB agenda. Nonetheless, those contributions do not 
deal with the effects of different alternative labour market institutions on entry in the 
presence of a mixed duopoly, in which a public firm and a private firm compete à la 
Cournot. 
While the above mentioned papers deal with private monopoly and oligopoly, we 
note that the public firms are real-life cases extremely relevant in several countries 
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and in several sectors (such as, e.g., telecommunication, utilities and transport 
systems). The early literature considering the comparison between public and private 
monopoly (and oligopoly) outcomes includes De Fraja and Delbono (1987, 1989, 
1990) and, as regards wages comparisons, De Fraja (1993). The work of De Fraja 
(1993) is related to the present one. On the one hand, this paper extends the De 
Fraja’s model which considers only the RTM case and, on the other hand, extends the 
aim of the De Fraja’s work which mainly focused on the relationship between public 
and private wages and on the effects of privatisation on wages. In fact, the present 
paper aims to analyse 1) the choice of alternative bargaining agendas by public and 
private monopoly firms, and compares the corresponding equilibrium outcomes not 
only in terms of relative wages but also of the relative welfare of the various agents 
and social welfare as a whole, 2) the effects of the bargaining agenda in the long run 
through an entry game. 
As regards the former point (i.e. the endogenous choice of the bargaining agenda in 
the usual short-run context), the principal results of the present paper are as follows. 
Under both private and public monopoly, the bargained wages are the same under the 
RTM and EB agenda; the profits are always higher under RTM
1
; conversely, the 
union’s utility and consumer’s surplus are always higher under EB.  
More interestingly, the RTM  agenda always emerges as the sub-perfect equilibrium 
with private as well as public monopoly. This result as regards the public monopoly 
is not a priori expected because workers and consumers prefer EB. However, the 
overall social welfare is always larger with RTM than EB negotiations, despite the 
latter arrangement benefits both workers and consumers relatively more than the 
RTM arrangement. The rationale for this result is that the negotiations under the EB 
institution have an extremely negative impact on profits that overcomes the positive 
effects on the union’s and consumer’s welfare, in comparison with the RTM agenda. 
By contrast, in the private monopoly case, challenging the conventional wisdom, the 
overall social welfare may be higher (lower) under RTM than EB provided that the 
political weight of the union is adequately low (high) and the reservation wage and 
the union bargaining power sufficiently high (low). 
These findings imply that there is a conflict of interests between union and firm also 
in the case of public firm, despite the latter takes care also of the union’s welfare. 
Moreover there are always conflicting preferences also between the Government and 
consumers.  
Another interesting finding emerges by the comparison between public and private 
monopoly outcomes: social welfare may be higher under private monopoly (provided 
that the political weight of the union, the reservation wage and the union bargaining 
power are sufficiently high), despite the fact that the latter takes care only of its own 
profit while the public monopoly takes care of the social welfare. The latter finding 
implies that, rather paradoxically,  a Government very sensible to the union’s welfare 
should prefer a private monopoly while the union and the consumers prefer a public 
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 However, in the public company profits tend to be negative when the weight of the union in its 
objective function becomes sufficiently high both with the RTM and EB negotiations. 
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monopoly. The result that the social welfare in the private monopoly case may be 
higher than the welfare in the public monopoly case is due to the effects of the 
presence of unions and reverts the well-established results early shown by De Fraja 
and Delbono (1987, 1989) with monopolies without unions.
2
 
As regard long run issues, De Fraja and Delbono (1989) study the long run optimal 
number of firms, but they “rule out the presence of potential entrants” (p. 303). Also 
De Fraja (1993, p. 468) observes that “the model lends itself naturally to the analysis 
of the long run effects of privatisation”. However, in his model, the long run issues 
are only captured by a simple comparison between the equilibrium of the mixed 
duopoly and that of private duopoly. In the present paper, the long run issues are 
analysed through an entry game under private (public) incumbent and public (private) 
entrant, and under alternative bargaining schemes. 
When considering the issue of market entry, it is found that the public (private) 
monopolist may strategically commit to the RTM (EB) agenda to deter the entrance 
of a potential private (public) competitor. If RTM is the practice in place within the 
industry, a public incumbent company cannot strategically shift toward the alternative 
EB agenda to deter the entry of  a private competitor; however, an incumbent private 
company can use the EB agenda as a tool to deter market entrance of a public 
company, provided that the union bargaining power is below a threshold value. A 
diametrically opposed result applies if the EB agenda is the established bargaining 
practice in the industry. In fact, in this case, the incumbent private company cannot 
use the RTM agenda to deter the entry of a public competitor; however, an incumbent 
public company can shift toward the RTM negotiation to deter the entry of a private 
competitor, provided that the union bargaining power is above a threshold value. 
Therefore, the novel result of the present work is that, in striking contrast to the 
existing literature, also the RTM agenda can be an entry deterrence tool. The 
consequences of those findings from the point of view of the social welfare are 
striking. In fact, if the prevalent industry agenda is RTM, to introduce a private 
competitor in a publicly monopolised sector is more welfare beneficial than give the 
opportunity to form, a priori, a private monopoly. On the contrary, if the prevalent 
industry agenda is EB, to introduce a private competitor in a public monopoly can be 
welfare beneficial only if the unions are sufficiently weak. 
To sum up, the paper contributes to the literature on the bargaining agenda in 
unionised industries and is the first, at the best of our knowledge, to analyse the 
effects of the choice of the agenda both in short and long run with a public firm.  
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic 
ingredients of the model. While Section 3 analyzes the union-firm bargaining 
problem in the context of a private monopoly, Section 4 re-examines the subject in 
the presence of a public monopoly. Section 5 deals with a discussion of the 
comparative statics of the two scenarios. Section 6 investigates the issue of market 
entry in a mixed duopoly where the incumbent can be either a private or public 
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than the welfare in all other cases” (De Fraja and Delbono, 1989, p.305). 
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company, and briefly discusses the results and the impact on social welfare. Finally, 
Section 7 summarizes the key findings and implications and suggests directions for 
future research on the subject. 
 
2. The model 
 
Let us consider that there is only one firm in the market producing a good. The 
standard  inverse demand function faced by the monopolist is given by  
qap         (1) 
where p and q  are the price and quantity of good, respectively. 
The monopolist’s profit function, by assuming, as usual (e.g. De Fraja, 1993), that 
Lq  , where L is the employment, is given by: 
2)( wqqqa   ,      (2) 
where w is the per unit of output wage. We assume that the monopolistic firm is 
unionised.
3
 We consider the two typical negotiation models of the trade-union 
economics (Booth, 1995): 1) the Right-to-Manage model (RTM) (e.g. Nickell and 
Andrews, 1983), in which wages are the outcome of negotiations between firms and 
unionized labour; however, once wages are set, the firms have the right to set the 
employment levels; and 2) the efficient bargaining model (EB) which prescribes that 
the union and the firm are bargaining over both wages and employment (or, more 
realistically, hours of work) (e.g. McDonald and Solow, 1981; Ashenfelter and 
Brown, 1986; Manning, 1987a,b). 
The union has the following utility function:
4
     
LwwV )(  ,       (3)  
where  w° is the reserve or competitive wage. 
We assume that unions are identical. Therefore, by recalling that Lq  , (3) 
becomes:  
2.)( qwwV        
that is, the unions’ objective function is to maximise the total rent.  
The firm may be state-owned or private-owned. The social welfare is given by a 
weighted sum of consumers' surplus, CS, profit, and union's utility. It will be assumed 
here, following De Fraja (1993), that the analytical expression for the social welfare 
function is given by: mVCSSWPUB   . 
The weight attached to the union's utility has been assumed to be an exogenously 
given parameter: m(0,1],as better detailed in the next section.  
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 We assume that the members of the union are large enough to meet the firm’s labour demand.   
4
 This is a specific case of the more general Stone-Geary utility function, i.e., Pencavel (1984, 
1985), Dowrick and Spencer (1994): 
  V w w L

   ,  
A value of 1  gives the rent-maximising case (i.e. the union seeks to maximise the total rent); 
values of 1)(   imply that the union is less (more) concerned about wages and more (less) 
concerned about jobs. Moreover, the union aims to maximise the wage bill when 0w . 
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Let us begin by illustrating the case of private monopoly firm
5
 under the cases of 
RTM and EB
6
. 
 
3. Private Monopoly 
 
3.1 RTM institution 
 
At stage 2 solving the profit maximisation  problem of monopolist firm, we get the 
following output function, for given wage 
   
)(2
)(
w
a
wq



       (4) 
At first stage of the game, under Right-to Manage, monopolist - union bargaining unit 
selects w, to maximize the following generalized Nash product, 
        bbbb
wtrw
qwwwqqqaVN 2
121
...
)(max 

  ,   (5)  
where b  represents the bargaining union’s power.  
Maximising eq. (5) with respect to w, after substitution of eq. (3) in (4), we obtain the 
wage : 
     bbwwRTMPRI  )1(       (6) 
By using (6) we obtain the equilibrium output:  
)1)((2 bw
a
q
RTM
PRI



       (7) 
By using (6) and (7)  the other equilibrium outcomes are obtained: 
 
)1)((4
2
bw
aRTM
PRI



       (8) 
2
2
)1)((4 bw
ba
V
RTM
PRI



      (9) 
 
2
2
8 ( )(1 )
RTM
PRI
a
CS
w b



  
              (10) 
 2
2
2 ( )( 1) 2 3
8[( )(1 )]
RTM
PRI
a b w m w
SW
w b
 

     

  
                   (11) 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
  In the rest of the paper the subscript PRI (PUB) denotes the private monopoly (public monopoly, 
respectively). 
6
 We note that the equilibrium outcomes of the  Simultaneous Efficient Bargaining  are the same of 
those of the Sequential EB for both private and public monopoly (the straightforward demonstration 
is omitted here for economy of space).  
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3.2. Efficient Bargaining institution. 
 
Under efficient-bargaining the private monopolist-union bargaining unit maximizes 
the following generalised Nash product, 
        bbbb
qwtrw
qwwwqqqaVN 2
121
,...
)(max 

  ,           (12)  
Hence, the private monopolist- union bargaining unit selects at the first stage 
simultaneously w and q in the case of EB. 
From the system of first-order conditions of the efficient bargaining game between 
private monopolist and union, the following system is obtained: 
  
)(2
)1(
w
ba
wq




,   (13) 
  
q
aqbbqw
qw
)()1( 


  (14) 
)(2 

w
a
q
EB
PRI               (15) 
RTM
PRI
EB
PRI ww                (16) 
By using (15) and (16)  the other equilibrium outcomes are obtained: 
)(4
)1(2





w
baEB
PRI               (17) 
)(4
2


w
ba
V
EB
PRI               (18) 
 
2
2
8 ( )
EB
PRI
a
CS
w



 
               (19) 
 2
2
2 ( )( 1) 2 3
8( )
EB
PRI
a b w m w
SW
w
 

     

 
           (20) 
 
4. Public Monopoly. 
 
Consider next a public monopoly firm. The Government instructs the public 
monopolist to maximise the social welfare, where, as seen in the previous section,  
the weight on the union’s utility is less than one. There are two reasons  why the 
weight on the union’s utility is less than one, the first eminently algebraic and the 
second, namely, political. 
As regards the former it is easy to see that the public firm’s union could limitlessly 
raise its wage because the optimal output level of the public firm is independent of 
the wage,
7
 while as regards the latter “there may be political reasons why an increase 
in union utility is not considered as positive an occurrence as an increase in the profit 
accruing to the Treasury or as a reduction in the price of the good (De Fraja, 1993, p. 
460). 
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 Alternatively, m can be fixed equal to one but then, in order to solve this problem, the bargaining 
choices have to face a budget constraint with respect to the level of profit of the public firm. 
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In what follows we investigate the cases of RTM and EB. 
 
4.1 RTM institution 
 
At stage 2 solving the social welfare maximisation problem of public monopoly firm, 
we get the following output function: 
  ( )
2[(1 ) ]
a
q w
m w mw

   
             (21) 
 
At first stage of the game, under Right-to Manage, public monopoly- union 
bargaining unit selects w, to maximize the following generalized Nash product, 
         
1
2
1 2 2 2
. . .
( )
max ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
b
bb b
PUB PUB
w r t w
q w
N SW V a q w q w wq w m w w q w w w q w



  
          
 
(22)
where b represents the bargaining union’s power.  
Maximising eq. (22) with respect to w, after substitution of eq. (21) in (22), we obtain 
the wage: 
    
2 (1 )
2(1 )
RTM
PUB
w b m b
w
m
   


               (23) 
By using (23) we obtain the equilibrium output: 
(2 )(1 )
RTM
PUB
a
q
w b

  
                        (24) 
By using (23) and (24)  the other equilibrium outcomes are obtained: 
 2
2
2 (2 ) 2 (1 )
2(1 )(2 )(1 )
RTM
PUB
a bm w w b m b
m w b
 


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
   
             (25) 
2
22(1 )(2 )(1 )
RTM
PUB
a b
V
m w b

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               (26) 
2
2 22(2 ) (1 )
RTM
PUB
a
CS
w b



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                (27) 
2
2(2 )(1 )
RTM
PUB
a
SW
w b

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             (28) 
 
4.2. Efficient Bargaining institution. 
 
Under efficient-bargaining the public monopoly-union bargaining unit maximizes the 
following generalised Nash product, 
         
1
2
1 2 2 2
. . . ,
( )
max ( )
2
b
bb b
PUB PUB
w r t w q
q w
N SW V a q q wq m w w q w w q



  
          
 
         (29) 
Hence, the public monopolist-union bargaining unit selects at the first stage 
simultaneously w and q in the case of EB. 
From the system of first-order conditions of the efficient bargaining game between 
monopolist and union, the following system is obtained: 
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q
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              (32) 
RTM
PUB
EB
PUB ww                (33) 
 
By using (32) and (33)  the other equilibrium outcomes are: 
 
    
2
2
[2 ( 1) ]
2(2 ) (1 )
EB
PUB
a w b m b
w m



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
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            (34) 
2
2(2 )(1 )
EB
PUB
a b
V
w m

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               (35) 
2
22(2 )
EB
PUB
a
CS
w



 
             (36) 
2(1 )
2(2 )
EB
PUB
a b
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w 


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               (37) 
 
5. Comparison of  equilibrium results 
 
In this section, armed with the equilibrium outcomes for both alternative bargaining 
agendas and types of firm’s ownership, we may study which will be the choice of 
agenda and its corresponding effects on welfare. First, we show the choice of agenda 
and compare whether and how wages, quantities, profits, union’s welfare and social 
welfare differ between the two bargaining agendas. Second, we compare private and 
public outcomes.  
 
Let’s define the following differentials (where x is a generic variable assuming the 
meaning of the subscript i) : PUBPRIjSWqVixxx EBji
RTM
jiji ,;,,,,,,,   . 
 
5. 1.  Private Monopoly. 
 
Result 1. Wages are the same under RTM and EB,
8
 the profit is always higher under 
RTM, while the union’s utility and consumer’ surplus are always higher under EB, 
and SW may be higher (lower) under RTM provided that m sufficiently low and w°,, 
b sufficiently high. Proof:  
 
                                                 
8
 Given that under monopoly there is not a strategic interaction in the quantity (i.e. employment), 
bargaining over wages simultaneously or subsequently with respect to the choice of employment 
obtains the same wages and thus the analysis of De Fraja (1993, p. 461) on the wages paid by the 
public and private monopolist under RTM holds true under EB as well. 
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22 ( ) ( 2 ) 2
0, 0, 0, 0
2 ( )(2 )
PRI PRI PRI PRI
b w w b
V q SW m
b w b
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

       
       
   
  
 
Corollary 1. Private monopoly always chooses the RTM arrangement. 
 
While the finding as regards profits, union and consumer is expected, the fact that 
social welfare as a whole may be larger under RTM is less expected, but it is due to 
the fact that when the weight attached to union’s utility in the social welfare is 
sufficiently low, the relative gain in profits under RTM is so large that it overweighs 
the relative loss for union and consumer in the evaluation of the overall social 
welfare. 
 
5.2 Public Monopoly. 
 
Result 2. Wages are the same under RTM and EB; although the profit tends to be 
negative when m tend to be sufficiently high for both RTM and EB, the profit under 
RTM is always significantly higher than that under EB,
9
 and this profit differential in 
favour of RTM is increasing with increasing union’s power. As in the case of the 
private monopoly, the union’s utility and consumer’ surplus are always higher under 
EB. Proof:  0,0,0  PUBPUBPUB qV  
 
Therefore, Res. 2  states that, in line with the intuition, the public monopoly incurs 
large profit losses when it bargains also on employment, especially when both the 
union’s utility is highly evaluated in the social welfare function  and union’s power is 
large. 
 
Result 3. SW is always higher under the RTM arrangement. Proof: ,0 PUBSW  
 
Corollary 2. Public monopoly always chooses RTM like the private firm, although it 
is interested also to consumer’s and union’s welfares which are higher under EB. 
 
The intuition behind Res. 2-3 and Corollary 2 is that the EB arrangement causes, in 
comparison with the RTM one, a so larger negative effect on profits which is more 
than counterbalancing the larger positive effect on the union’s and consumer’s 
welfare. As a consequence, we have the result that a public monopoly firm behaves 
as a private firm in the choice of the bargaining agenda, despite the fact that in its 
objective the utility of the union may have at the limit the same weight of the profit.   
Therefore, we may conclude that, both in the private and public monopoly, the 
bargaining agenda will be the RTM one.  
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 For instance, when a=1, w°=0, =1 and b=0.5, profits under RTM are negative for m>0.5, while 
those under EB are always negative 
11 
 
5.3. Comparison between private and public monopoly. 
 
The above finding regarding the occurrence of the same agenda irrespective of 
whether the firm is public or private poses some relevant questions. Under the chosen 
bargaining agenda (RTM) does public monopoly obtain, as the conventional wisdom 
believes, the highest social welfare? How are welfares of single agents affected by 
the choice of the agenda? 
The answers are not univocal: in particular, as regards the first question, surprisingly, 
the private monopoly may be more efficient than the public one.  
Let’s define the following differentials (where x is a generic variable assuming the 
meaning of the subscript i): 
, ,
, , ,RTM RTM
i i PRI i PUB
x x x i V q SW    . 
 
Lemma 1. The wage in the private monopoly firm may be higher than that in the 
public monopoly firm provided that w° is sufficiently high and  and m sufficiently 
low.
10
 Proof:  
 
(1 2 )
0 ; 0, , .
2 i
m w
w w w i m
m x


    
      
  
. 
 
Result 4. The private monopoly is more efficient than the public one when b, m, and 
w°  are sufficiently high and  is sufficiently low 11. Proof:  
 
2 *[ (1 3 ) (1 ) 4 ]
0 * ; 0 ; 0 ; 0
4
o o ob m b b m m w w w
SW w w
bm m b


        
       
    
 
 
Result 5. Both consumer’s welfare and unions’ utility are higher under public 
monopoly. Proof:  
 
2 2 2 2
2 2 2
(4 3 ) [2 ( 1)]
;
8(2 )( ) (1 ) 4(1 )( )(2 )(1 )
a w a b mw m
CS V
w w b m w w b
  
   
    
     
         
 
 
Therefore our conclusion is interesting: a private monopoly may be more efficient. 
More interestingly this occurs when the union is strong, but also its utility is highly 
taken into account by the government. Moreover there is a conflicting view between 
Government, on the one side, and workers and consumers on the other side as regards 
the preferred bargaining agenda. 
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 We refer to De Fraja (1983, p.461) for a thorough analysis as to why the wage paid by the public 
monopolist may be lower than that a private monopolist would pay. 
11
 It is easy to observe that this interesting result is due to the presence of union and that in the 
absence of union the established result by De Fraja and Del Bono (1989) (see also footnote 1) holds 
true. 
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6. Entry and Welfare Considerations 
 
In this section, we briefly examine the issue of the strategic use of the two alternative 
bargaining agendas, i.e. EB and RTM, as a tool to deter potential market entry in the 
present context of mixed duopoly.  
We focus on the committed bargaining where the entrant is obliged to “join the pack” 
and adopt the agenda of the incumbent, both under “blockaded duopoly”, i.e. duopoly 
is the given market structure, and monopoly with threat of market entry (Bughin, 
1999; Buccella, 2011; Fanti e Buccella 2015c). The principal result of the above 
mentioned literature is that, in the presence of a private Cournot duopoly with 
standard substitute goods and constant returns to scale technology, the EB agenda can 
be used as entry deterrence mechanisms.  
For each bargaining agenda, we analyse the following situations. First, the incumbent 
firm is a private company and the entrant a public one. Second, the incumbent firm is 
a public company and the potential competitor a private firm. Figure 1 illustrates all 
the possible sequences of events. 
 
6.1 Committed bargaining with blockaded duopoly 
 
The analysis in the case of blockaded duopoly is straight forward. In fact, from 
Corollary 2, it is directly derived that RTM is the equilibrium agenda because both 
the private and the public company always prefer RTM to EB.  
 
Figure 1 Market structures and bargaining configurations 
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6.2 Committed bargaining with threat of market entry 
 
The analysis is more articulated in case of threat of entry. As in Bughin (1999), 
Buccella (2011), and Fanti e Buccella (2015c), entry in the industry is modelled as a 
change from a monopoly to a duopoly market structure. The potential entrant firm 
faces an exogenous fixed cost denoted by E . To generalise the discussion, and not to 
make the notation too heavy, in the following we omit the term E  which, 
nonetheless, does not alter the companies’ maximization problem. 
In the case of entry, the sector is always characterized by a mixed duopoly with the 
presence of one public and one private firm. Following De Fraja (1993), the firms 
compete a la Cournot on equal terms in the product market for homogeneous goods 
and exploit the identical technology.  
 
6.2.1 RTM prevalent industry agenda 
 
Let us first consider the case of RTM as the prevalent agenda in the industry, as in De 
Fraja (1993). The sequence of moves is as follows. In stage 1, each union-firm 
bargaining unit simultaneously conducts wage negotiations without having 
knowledge about the outcome of the negotiations in the rival unit. The bargaining 
process is assumed to satisfy the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, calculated by 
considering the subsequent outcome of the product game which firms will play after 
wages have been set.
12
 In stage 2, after that both firms have negotiated wages, those 
are announced publicly, and firms simultaneously makes their output and, 
consequently, employment decisions. As usual the game is solved in the backward 
fashion. Given the outlined assumptions, the firms’ maximization problem is 
    
2 2
2 2
2
( ) {[ ( )] }
2
{[ ( ) ] } [ ( ) ]
[ ( ) ]
RTM
PUB PRI PUB PRI PUB
PUB PRI PUB PRI PRI PRI PRI
PUB PRI PUB PUB PUB PRI PRI
PUB PUB
SW CS mV mV
q q a q q q w q
a q q q w q m w w q
m w w q
 


 

     
      
     

                     (38) 
 
2[ ( )]
PRI PUB PRI PRI PRI PRI
a q q q w q     ,               (39) 
 
for the public and the private company, respectively. In line with De Fraja (1993), the 
solution of the system of equations represented by the two firms FOCs, lead to the 
following expressions for the equilibrium output  
 
(2 )
PRI
PUB
a w
q
 

                                   (40) 
                                                 
12
 Following De Fraja (1993, 463) in the Nash product the reference values of union’s utility and 
firm’s profit are set to zero. 
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* 2 [ (1 ) ]PUB
PRI
a w m mw
q
 


                          (41) 
 
where 
 
( 2 ) ( 4 )[(1 ) )]
PRI PRI PUB
w w m w mw          .  
 
In the first stage of the game, the bargaining problems of the public and private firms 
take the following form, respectively 
 
      
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



 
  
 
 
  
 
       
    
 
    
   (42) 
 
      
11 * * * *2 *2
. . .
max [ ( )]
bbb b
PRI PUB PRI PRI PRI PRI PRI PRI
w r t wPRI
N V a q q q w q w w q 

         . (43) 
 
However, as De Fraja (1993) has already pointed out, the analytical expressions of 
the solutions for the equilibrium wages are complex and excessively long to be here 
reported. We take advantage of that author numerical simulations to construct Table 
1, where the equilibrium wages, quantities, price and the equilibrium profits in mixed 
duopoly of the public and private companies are reported. For our purposes, in the 
last four columns, the social welfare under duopoly with the RTM institution, the 
social welfare under private monopoly, and the public and private monopoly profits 
with the EB institution are calculated. Again, strictly following De Fraja (1993, 
p.463), the numerical simulations consider the following four scenarios: 1) m=0, w
o
 
=0; 2) m=0, w
o
 =0.5; 3) m=0.5, w
o
 =0; 4) m=0.5, w
o
 =0.5.  
As Bughin (1999), Buccella (2011) and Fanti and Buccella (2015c) highlights, in the 
case of committed bargaining and threat of market entry, if the fixed costs the entrant 
faces are such that 
 
    Monopoly profits EB E Duopoly profits RTM  ,              (44) 
 
a duopoly exists under RTM; however, the incumbent retains a monopoly position if 
it selects EB. On the other hand, if the monopoly profits under EB are larger than the 
duopoly profits under RTM, the incumbent has the opportunity to commit 
strategically to the EB agenda to prevent the market entry of a potential competitor 
under RTM. Our numerical simulations in Table 1 show that, in all the four proposed 
scenarios, there is a fundamental asymmetry if the incumbent firm is a private or 
public company.  
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a) RTM prevalent agenda, incumbent private company, entrant public company  
 
Remark 1 In the presence of a monopoly with threat of market entry, if  the 
incumbent is a private company and the potential entrant is a public company, the 
private incumbent firm can use the EB agenda as entry deterrence mechanism. In 
fact, there is a critical value of the union bargaining power b  such that, for b b , 
, ,Duopoly RTM Monopoly EB
PRI PRI
   as the green boxes in Table 1 reveal.  
 
Table 1 Numerical simulations, RTM agenda 
 
Legend: The parameter m  represents the weight of union's utility in the public firm's utility function, b  is the union 
bargaining power, rw (w
o
 in the main text) the reservation wage, w0 (q0) and w1 (q1) are the equilibrium wages 
(quantities) in the public (private) firm in the mixed duopoly, respectively, and p is the price level. The reference values 
for the parameters a and beta are as follows: a=10, beta=0.5. The numerical simulations consider the following four 
scenarios: 1) m=0, rw=0; 2) m=0, rw=0.5; 3) m=0.5, rw=0; 4) m=0.5, rw=0.5. Furthermore, profits and SW for the 
private duopoly, private monopoly and public monopoly are also reported. 
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Therefore, if the labour market is characterized by the RTM institution, an incumbent 
private company may strategically commit to the EB agenda to deter market entry 
provided that the union bargaining power is adequately low. This result is in line with 
the findings of Bughin (1999), Buccella (2011), and Fanti e Buccella (2015c). 
The reservation wage seems to play a more crucial role than the unions’ “political” 
weight. The simulations demonstrate that, for an identical reservation wage but 
different union political weight m, the threshold value of the unions’ bargaining 
power that allows the private incumbent to switch toward the EB agenda to prevent 
the entry of the public competitor is similar: .9b   in scenarios 1 and 3; a value of 
(.5,.6)b  in scenarios 2 and 4. 
 
b) RTM prevalent agenda, incumbent public company, entrant private company  
 
Remark 2 In the presence of a monopoly with threat of market entry, if  the 
incumbent is a public company and the potential entrant is a private company, the 
public incumbent firm cannot  use the EB agenda as entry deterrence mechanism. In 
fact, the results in Table 1 shows that for the public incumbent company always holds 
, ,Duopoly RTM Monopoly EB
PUB PUB
SW SW . 
 
Intuitively, the rationale for Remark 2 can be that the public company has to include 
into its objective function also the profits of the private entrant.  
 
6.2.2 EB prevalent industry agenda 
 
Let us now analyze the case of the EB agenda as the practice in place in the industry. 
The sequence of moves is as follows. In stage 1, each union-firm bargaining unit 
simultaneously negotiate wages and employment without having knowledge of the 
bargaining outcome in the rival unit. Also under these circumstances, the negotiation 
process is supposed to adhere to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. Given the 
outlined assumptions, the bargaining problems of the public and private firms 
become, respectively 
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 
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    
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      
11 * * * *2 *2
. . . ,
max [ ( )]
bbb b
PRI PUB PRI PRI PRI PRI PRI PRI
w r t w qPRI PRI
N V a q q q w q w w q 

         .(46) 
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It can be shown that the solution of the system of equations composed by the two 
firms FOCs lead to the following expressions for the equilibrium wages and outputs  
 
3 2 2 2 2 3
2
{8 [(1 )( 1) 2 ] 8 [(1 )( 1) 4 )] 2 [(1 ) 5 ] }
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                                   (50) 
 
As for the RTM case, we perform some numerical simulations. We consider the 
following four scenarios with the values of the parameters extremely close to those in 
the previous simulations
13
: 1) m=0, w
o
 =0.01; 2) m=0, w
o
 =0.5; 3) m=0.5, w
o
 =0.01; 
4) m=0.5, w
o
 =0.5. The results are reported in Table 2. 
Similarly to the previous case, in the presence of committed bargaining, if the fixed 
costs the entrant faces are such that 
             
    Monopoly profits RTM E Duopoly profits EB  ,              (51) 
 
a duopoly exists under EB but the incumbent firm preserves a monopoly position if it 
selects RTM. In addition, if the monopoly profits under RTM are larger than the 
duopoly profits under EB, the incumbent has the opportunity to commit strategically 
to the RTM agenda to preclude entry of a potential competitor under EB. The 
numerical simulations in Table 2 reveal that there is again a fundamental asymmetry 
in all the four proposed scenarios if the incumbent firm is a private or public 
company.  
 
c) EB prevalent agenda, incumbent private company, entrant public company  
 
Remark 3 In the presence of a monopoly with threat of market entry, if the 
incumbent is a private company and the entrant a public firm, the RTM agenda 
cannot be used as an entry deterrence tool. In fact, as expected, for the incumbent 
private company, it holds that , ,Monopoly RTM Duopoly EB
PRI PRI
  .  
 
 
                                                 
13
 The main difference resides in the fact that we cannot assign under EB a value of the minimum 
wage equal to zero, otherwise the private firm is priced out of the market, see eq. (50) 
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Table 2 Numerical simulations, EB agenda 
 
Legend: see Tab.1 (except for rw=0.01 instead of rw=0). 
 
The reason for the result in Remark 3 is that the private company suffers the 
competition of the public one, competition which is highly intensive under EB 
because the overall social welfare, which is the objective of the potential public 
entrant, is directly linked to the overall output in the economy.  
 
d) EB prevalent agenda, incumbent public company, entrant private company  
 
Remark 4 In the presence of a monopoly with threat of market entry, if the 
incumbent is a public company and the potential entrant a private company, then the 
incumbent can use the RTM agenda as entry deterrence mechanism. In fact, there is a 
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threshold value of the union bargaining power b  such that, for b b  , 
, ,Monopoly RTM Duopoly EB
PUB PUB
SW SW  as the yellow boxes in Table 2 reveal. 
 
The finding in Remark 4 is antipodal to the result in Remark 1. In fact, if the labour 
market is formerly characterized by the EB institution, a public incumbent may 
strategically commit to the RTM agenda to deter entry provided that the union 
bargaining power is sufficiently high. This result is somewhat striking because, in 
principle, a public company should not be interested in introducing an entry barrier. 
However, Remark 4 indicates that the incumbent public company has an interest in 
committing to RTM because the entry of a private competitor under EB when the 
union power is high can be more detrimental to social welfare. A plausible rationale 
for this result is that, with an EB duopoly, the profits of the private entrant and the 
increase of the unions’ utility are not large enough to compensate the consumers’ 
losses, generated by the pass through effects of higher negotiated wages on the final 
product price.   
As before, the reservation wage seems to drive this result more than the unions’ 
“political” weight. However, now the role played by the reserve wage seems to be 
opposite with respect to that played in the case of prevalent RTM agenda for the 
private monopoly: the public firm may prevent entry more likely when the 
reservation wage is high (e.g. when manpower is relatively high skilled and there are 
sizable unemployment benefits). Our numerical simulations show that, for an 
identical reservation wage but diverse union political weight m, the threshold value of 
the unions’ power that permits the public monopolist to switch toward the RTM 
agenda to prevent entry is similar: (0,.1)b  in scenarios 1 and 3; a value of 
(.4,.5)b  in scenario 2 and (.5,.6)b  in scenario 4. Those findings seem to suggest 
that an incumbent public company, in the presence of low reservation wages, by 
committing to the RTM agenda can virtually avoid the entrance of a private 
competitor in the industry.  
 
6.3 Welfare considerations 
 
With regard to social welfare, given that a private (public) monopolist can use the EB 
(RTM) agenda as a deterrence tool in the presence of threat of entry, it is of crucial 
interest to check whether the private (public) monopoly with EB (RTM) can be 
socially more preferable than the mixed public/private duopoly with RTM (EB). The 
results of the numerical simulations in Table 1 (RTM prevalent industry agenda)  
unequivocally shows that  ,  ,Mixed Duopoly RTM Private Monopoly EBSW SW : a mixed duopoly with 
the RTM agenda is socially preferable. On the other hand, the findings in Table 2 (EB 
prevalent industry agenda) shows that  ,  ,Public Monopoly RTM Mixed Duopoly EBSW SW if b b
 
 
. 
Those observation have the following direct consequence in terms of policy: 
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Remark 5 From a social point of view, if the prevalent bargaining agenda in the 
industry is RTM, the entry of a private competitor in the industry where an incumbent 
public company operates is always welfare superior than have a monopoly with a 
private incumbent. Conversely, if the prevalent bargaining agenda in the industry is 
EB, the entry of a private competitor in the industry where a public incumbent 
operates can be welfare beneficial only if the unions are adequately weak.  
 
In other words, there can be a well-grounded rationale for public intervention in 
sectors of the economy under risk of monopolization. Therefore, the findings of the 
present work have a striking impact on the governments’ decision-making 
proceedings and antitrust authorities activities. In fact, before designing and 
implementing any intervention to regulate product and labour markets, the aspects 
stressed in our study suggest that those institutions should 1) consider the nature of 
the product market in the industry; and 2) take into account the bargaining framework 
and the practices there in place.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The present paper has investigated a key aspect of labour union-firm management 
relations, that is the choice of the bargaining agenda in the context of a public/private 
unionised monopoly and the role of alternative agendas on the market entry. The 
paper has concentrated the attention on the impact of different bargaining agendas, 
namely RTM and EB, on profits and the overall social welfare. Our analysis has 
found that the RTM is the preferred way negotiation agenda both for the private and 
the public company.
14
 
In particular, we have found that wages are identical under RTM and EB, the profits 
are always higher under RTM, and the union’s utility and consumer’ surplus are 
higher under EB, irrespective of whether the industry is characterized by a private or 
a public monopoly. Moreover, social welfare is higher in the case of public 
monopoly, while in the case of private monopoly it can be higher under RTM 
provided that the union’s weight is sufficiently low and the reservation wage and 
union bargaining power high enough. Noteworthy, we also find that private 
monopoly is socially preferred to the public one and conflict of interests on the 
preferred agenda arises between Government on one side and workers and consumers 
on the other side.  
We have also analysed the issue of market entry under committed bargaining , where 
the entrant “join the pack” and follows the industry practice. We have found that the 
public (private) monopolist may commit to the RTM (EB) agenda to deter the entry 
of a potential private (public) competitor. In other words, the incumbent may 
strategically use the agenda as a deterrence tool. In detail, if RTM is the bargaining 
agenda in place, a public incumbent company cannot switch to the EB agenda to 
                                                 
14
 This result is not self-evident for the case of public monopoly because it maximizes the social 
welfare and consumers and workers would prefer EB. 
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deter the entry of a private competitor. On the other hand, an incumbent private 
company can use the EB agenda to deter market the entry of a public company, if the 
union bargaining power is lower than a threshold value. An antipodal result holds if 
the EB agenda is the established practice in the industry. In this case, the incumbent 
private company cannot use the RTM agenda to deter the entry of a public 
competitor. However, an incumbent public company can change to the RTM agenda 
to deter the entry of a potential private competitor, if the union bargaining power is 
higher than a threshold value. Thus, also the RTM agenda can be used as an entry 
deterrence tool. The implications of our findings are far-reaching. If the prevalent 
bargaining agenda in the industry is RTM, to introduce a privately owned competitor 
in a publicly monopolised sector is more welfare beneficial for the society than give a 
priori the opportunity to form a private monopoly. On the contrary, if the prevalent 
industry agenda is EB, to introduce a privately owned competitor in a publicly 
monopolised sector can be welfare beneficial only if the unions are relatively weak. 
To facilitate analytical tractability, the model presents some limitations. For example, 
we have used specific functional forms to define the demand schedule and the union 
utility. We have considered only quantity competition and homogenous goods in the 
product market. The findings in the paper are also far from being exhaustive. A direct 
step would be to develop the research toward price competition and heterogeneous 
products. Moreover, the strength of the present results can be verified in an extended 
game framework where also R&D investments, managerial delegation, externalities 
in consumption, and capacity choices are taken into account.  
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